The results of an IMF study on controls on capital inflows in emerging economies
I. Introduction
Economic theory predicts that capital controls have significant negative effects: they reduce the supply of capital; raise the cost of financing; increase financial constraints for domestic firms that do not have direct access to international capital markets; reduce the discipline of markets on decision making; increase the risk or corruption; lead to costly effects of avoidance and enforcement; and reduce property rights so that approvals for long-term investors (on the part of pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds) are normally excluded. 1 The removal of such controls should improve prospects for economic growth (see for example Obstfeld, 1998) . It is for reasons such as these that the OECD Codes of Liberalisation 2 are one of OECD' most important legal instruments, being a signatory to which is one of the prerequisites for joining the Organisation. Yet there are important differences of view. Rodrik (1998) makes an alternative case that asymmetric information and implicit insurance can result in excessive lending for risky projects that increase the chance of credit boom and bust cycles. More favourable views on capital controls in developing countries have had some ascendency in recent years, particularly following the Asia crisis in the late 1990s and Chile's apparent success in using capital controls to avert currency crises.
There is a considerable body of microeconomic evidence showing that emerging economies that lift capital controls do experience the positive benefits predicted by economic theory. Particularly where firms do not have ready access to international capital markets, lifting controls sees a reduced dependence on cash flows for capital expenditure (Harrison et al., 2004; Forbes, 2003) . Similarly, property rights improve and newly "investible" firms see increased investment, rising stock prices and a fall in the cost of equity (Chari and Henry, 2004 ). Yet on the macroeconomic side studies have found at best ambiguous results.
For example, Prasad et al. (2003) found no significant relationship between openness and growth in per capita income between countries, after controlling for initial endowments, and their survey of other studies shows mixed results (though none found that liberalisation reduces growth). Similarly, Satyanath and Berger (2007) , 3 in a panel of 50 (mostly) emerging economies, controlling for standard economic growth determinants, find that there is no statistically significant linkage between capital controls on inflows and lower average economic growth over the period 1995-05, i.e. prior to the global financial crisis (GFC).
Most of the support for capital controls derives from experiences where the defence of falling exchange rates and the loss of reserves in a crisis are an issue, and/or where countries wish to avoid exchange rate appreciation to support trade while also wishing (inconsistently) to run independent monetary policies by avoiding excess foreign exchange reserves accumulation. With respect to crises, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was one of the first international organisations to change its tone (e.g. Fischer, 2001) , and more recently this has continued with published empirical research that shows capital controls in emerging markets were very helpful in avoiding output loss in the GFC. Ostry et al. (2010) review the arguments about controls on certain types of capital inflows -notably debt and some components of financial foreign direct investment (FDI) -that can make emerging countries more susceptible to crises due to lower risk sharing between creditors and borrowers. Furthermore, debt inflows and some components of FDI might be associated with domestic lending booms and foreign-exchange mismatches in the domestic banking system (Wakeman-Linn, 2007) , which could lead to greater financial fragility. In testing these ideas the authors find empirical evidence that controls on such capital inflows prior to the GFC is associated with reduced financial vulnerability during the crisis.
The purpose of this paper is to further investigate the issue of whether countries that had such controls on inflows 4 in place prior to the crisis were indeed less vulnerable during the GFC, and also to examine the more general question of whether capital controls have an adverse effect on economic growth over the entire economic cycle. The main results suggest that the IMF probit model approach is not robust to a stability test. An alternative panel regression approach, using the same countries and capital control measures as the IMF study, finds somewhat different results between the pre-crisis and the crisis periodsthat capital restrictions on inflows (particularly debt liabilities) are most useful in good times when inflows to emerging markets are strong and upward pressure on managed exchange rates and reserves accumulation is greatest. However, lower controls on bonds and on FDI inflows seem to be associated with better growth outcomes during crisis periods. These findings are more consistent with studies that see capital controls as part of exchange rate targeting policies and concerns about excess reserves accumulation.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II presents and replicates the probit regression results by Ostry et al. (2010) , and carries out a test of their robustness.
Section III further examines the issue of capital controls for the same sample of countries and over the same time period using a panel regression approach. Section IV concludes. Ostry et al. (2010) • Shares or other securities of a participating nature:
II. Capital controls and financial fragility during the GFC: a probit model approach

II.1. IMF methodology and the data
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• Financial credits:
• Direct investment:
For an individual asset category in a given country, the level of controls on capital inflows is calculated by taking the average of the binary indicators. Ostry et al. (2010) considered four capital control measures. The first overall indicator (O_I) is based on the six components of capital inflows. Then, three additional indicators are considered to capture, respectively, the level of controls on FDI (FDI_I), bonds (BD_I) and equities (EQ_I) inflows.
Each of the four indices is averaged over the period 2000-05. 7 Figure 1 shows the ranking of all countries in the sample by the overall level of capital controls (shown by the height of the dots). Figure 1 also shows the GDP gap in the columns (the difference in average annual real GDP growth rate during the crisis versus the pre-crisis period) which was the basis for constructing the dummy for the dependent variable. The crisis countries that take the value of 1 in the regressions are highlighted in grey and they are: Latvia (-19.97%), Turkey (-9.00%), Iceland (-8.33%) and Kazakhstan (-7.45%). This group does not include any Asian or Latin American developing countries.
II.2. Main results of the IMF study and stability analysis on the results
The probit model regression postulated in the paper by Ostry et al. (2010) is run in two steps, which are replicated in Table 1 below. First, the model uses only the indicator of controls on overall inflows (equation [1] in Table 1 ). Second, the model includes separate indices for controls on FDI, equity and bond inflows (equation [2] in Table 1 ). A positive coefficient means that the capital control indicator would be associated with a larger decline in the real GDP growth rate, and a negative coefficient a smaller decline. Ostry et al. (2010) suggest that their results are suggestive correlations only. They conclude tentatively that there is at least some evidence, based on this work, which suggests that emerging economies with greater capital controls on inflows, especially on bond inflows, experienced lower decline in output growth rates during the GFC. Second, regressions are run on the sample of 37 countries by also including the country with the next largest GDP gap, Russia, as a crisis country (Russia has virtually the same decline in output as in Kazakhstan which is already included). 9 Thus 5 of 37 countries are Table 2 .
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When Latvia with its 20% output drop is excluded, the coefficient on overall inflows remains positive but falls in significance from the 5% level (in Table 1 ) to the 10% level (in Table 1 , appear not to be sufficiently robust to these stability tests to make any strong claims about the success of capital controls.
III. Capital controls and economic growth around the GFC: A panel data approach
III.1. Definition of the variables
The following analysis augments the previous one by moving away from the use of 
III.2. The model and the data
A dynamic panel regression approach is used to study the relationship between controls on capital inflows and annual real GDP growth around the GFC. To account for autocorrelation in the real GDP growth rate its lagged value is added as an explanatory variable. In addition, as annual real world GDP growth is presumably (in part) endogenous to annual national real GDP growth, 10 this explanatory variable has been instrumented. 11
The empirical model for overall controls is shown as equation [A] , while equation [B] includes the set of capital control indices for FDI, equity and bond inflows. Subscripts i and t denote country and period, respectively.
[A]
[B]
This model is estimated with the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) using first differences (Arellano and Bond, 1991) . were also run with Latvia excluded from the sample. In all cases, the results are consistent with those reported in Table 4 . They are not presented in the paper but are available from the authors upon request. For the pre-crisis sub-period the coefficient of the overall capital control indicator is positive and significant at the 1% level. This relationship, however, is inverted in the subsequent crisis sub-period: the coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% level over the period 2008-11, and at the 10% level from 2008 to 2009. 13 This is in contrast to the Ostry et al. (2010) probit model results which suggest that controls are most helpful during the crisis period. While more research is required here, the results appear to be more consistent with capital controls on inflows helping countries to maintain undervalued currencies in the good times, and therefore benefit from greater trade. Managed exchange rate policies in such periods also result in reserves accumulation and credit bubbles which authorities would try to avoid by inflow controls; this has less negative effects in good times as companies' cash flow is strong and credit constraints are less binding. The reversal of the result in the crisis period is broadly consistent with the idea that inflows dry up so that there is less upward pressure on the exchange rate, and perhaps the reverse when net inflows are negative, while domestic liquidity constraints became more binding.
N GDP N GDP W GDP LN OIL CPI O i t i t i t i t
_ _ _ _ _ _ , , , ,            0 1 1 2 3 4 I I i t i t , ,   N N W L N F D I GDPi t GDPi t GDPi t OIL i t I CPI , , , ,            0 1 1 2 3 4 i i t i
III.3. Estimation results
Countries with lower levels of capital controls on inflows may have performed better since more open economies are more appealing to foreign investors -they are less subject to political risk and the imposition of controls on outflows in a crisis. This helps to alleviate domestic company cash flow constraints in the global recession. While the Ostry et al. (2010) study and the results presented here focus on inflows, the interpretation put forward here is consistent with other studies that have focused on controls on capital outflows. Aizenman and Pasricha (2013) find that countries tighten outflows in economic recessions when inflows are more volatile, but loosen controls on outflows in good times when inflows are strong, currency appreciation is a concern and domestic reserves accumulation risks a credit boom -greater outflows in such periods help to ease such pressures. This interpretation is supported versus the alternative hypothesis that outflow controls are related to the need to keep savings at home to lower fiscal funding costs.
These above interpretations of the findings in this paper do not support the case for capital controls. In this view, the country objective is to benefit in the "good times" by targeting a lower exchange rate in the face of inflows and benefit from higher export competitiveness. Capital controls help to resolve the resulting conflict between policy objectives that can arise as foreign exchange market intervention leads to domestic credit and house price cycles.
This interpretation is not contradicted when the composition of capital controls is considered. "Bonds" in the sense used here are essentially portfolio and bank obligation flows that drive exchange rate pressures in the short run and are associated with foreign currency wholesale funding of the banking system (and hence the credit cycle). FDI on the other hand is longer-term in nature and often associated with multinational enterprises, where access to international capital markets is less problematic. Equity flows have quite different risk sharing characteristics compared to "bonds" or FDI.
The impact of capital controls on "bond" inflows on annual real GDP growth is significantly positive for the full sample periods and for the pre-crisis period (at the 1% level). However, this variable is significantly negative during the crisis (at the 10% level in the 2008-09 and at the 1% level in the longer 2008-11 period). This is not inconsistent with the interpretation posited for overall controls. These shorter-term capital flows are associated with exchange rate speculation and the foreign currency funding of banks that provide finance to smaller firms with less access to international markets. Such flows are often in the front line of capital control measures to support exchange rate targeting policies. When cash flow is strong prior to the crisis the benefits of exchange rate targeting may be more dominant, whereas during the crisis smaller companies are more dependent on bank finance which may be inhibited by controls on inflows.
The coefficient on controls on FDI is negative and significant at the 1%-level in the 2003-09 and the updated full sample period . It is also highly significant in the updated crisis sub-sample period . It is insignificant in the shorter (2003-07) precrisis period. Thus is seems overall that lower restrictions on FDI inflows allow countries to sustain greater economic growth from higher levels of investment inflows, which is particularly important during crisis periods.
Capital controls on equity inflows seem to have an insignificant relationship with annual real GDP growth over the full sample period, the pre-crisis period and the postcrisis period to 2009. The effect of adding two additional years to the crisis period (2007-11, versus 2007-09) leads to a significant positive coefficient. Given the strong possibility of measurement issues on all of these measures of capital controls, the instability here does not warrant any possible interpretation at this stage.
IV. Conclusion
High levels of potential profit from investments in emerging economies drive both longer-term and short-term capital flows into and out of these countries. Hence, policy makers and regulatory authorities of emerging economies face challenges to understand and appropriately manage these inflows and their impact at both the micro and the macro level. By performing a probit model regression on 37 mostly emerging economies, Ostry et al. (2010) found some modest evidence that controls on certain types of capital inflows before the GFC were associated with reduced financial vulnerabilities during the crisis.
However, this study was replicated and tested for stability. The results of these stability tests suggest the findings are not sufficiently robust to make any strong conclusions about the success or failure of the capital controls tool. Therefore, it is be premature to use this study to support any policy conclusions about the usefulness of such measure in emerging market economies.
The study was then extended to look at the impact of the IMF measures of capital controls on annual real GDP growth around the global crisis. The main results of the panel regressions contrast with the idea that controls are most beneficial in a crisis. Instead, the findings showed: that there was no support for overall controls over the full sample; that beneficial effects were found in the pre-crisis period; and negative effects were supported by the data for the crisis period itself. Most emerging countries focus on exchange rate targeting. In pre-crisis periods, when inflows are strong and the risk of exchange rate appreciation is high, imposing controls on inflows to reduce appreciation gives rise to strong trade benefits. And this takes place at a time when cash flows are strong and restraint on foreign funding of the banking system is less problematic for domestic firms.
In a crisis, however, funding constraints are more binding on firms as cash flows decline while the reversal of capital inflows puts downward pressure on the exchange rate.
Controls on capital inflows at these times are more problematic for firms, with negative implications for GDP growth. This interpretation was not contradicted by the results presented here when considering the composition of capital controls between bonds, equity and FDI.
The finding that controls on bond portfolio inflows helps GDP growth via exchange rate management in the "good times" is not surprising. When inflows are strong, upward pressure on the exchange rate is high and when there is a desire to avoid too rapid money and credit growth that results from foreign exchange market intervention, capital controls may help. But one should not lose sight of the fact that these distorting policies are the result of a choice not to follow an independent monetary policy supported by flexible exchange rates. Flexible exchange rates and openness puts more pressure on governments and the private sector to carry out micro-structural and competition reforms, for both of these sectors face the disciplines of market pressure that tends to reduce the prevalence of rent-seeking behaviour and corruption. Certainly no evidence is found in the data used in this study to support the notion that controls on capital inflows benefit GDP in crisis periods.
However, more research is required to establish the impact of capital controls on economic wellbeing in crisis and non-crisis periods. It will be important to use alternative measures of capital controls, as the IMF binary measures do not distinguish between the extensiveness and intensity of different controls in the various countries. Similarly, GDP is influenced by a complex interaction of factors that change over time as globalisation
